3 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
H1K0	945df7ef8a	fix(backend): enforce file ACL on file-tag and import endpoints ... Two broken-access-control holes: - PUT/DELETE /files/:id/tags(/:tag_id) and GET /files/:id/tags went straight to TagService with no ACL check, letting any authenticated user read or rewrite tags on anyone's private files. The handlers now require view (list) or edit (mutate) on the target file via new FileService.AuthorizeView/AuthorizeEdit helpers. - POST /files/import accepted an arbitrary host path from any user, turning it into an arbitrary server-side file read. It is now admin-only and the supplied path is confined to IMPORT_PATH. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-10 13:59:33 +03:00
H1K0	595b8fa671	feat(backend): implement full tag stack (repo, service, handler, routes) ... Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-04 21:29:20 +03:00
H1K0	5050dbea3c	feat(backend): implement file handler and wire all /files endpoints ... Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-04 18:40:04 +03:00