Listings returned every row regardless of ownership: GET /files, /tags,
/pools and /categories exposed other users' private items (while the
single-item GET correctly returned 403), and the pool file operations
(GET /pools/:id, /pools/:id/files, add/remove/reorder) skipped ACL
entirely, so any authenticated user could read and rewrite anyone's
private pool.
- List queries now filter to rows the caller may see (public, owned, or
granted can_view) via a shared SQL condition; admins bypass. The viewer
identity is taken from the request context by the service and passed to
the repository in the list params.
- Tag/Category/Pool single-item Get now enforce CanView (File already did).
- Pool Get/ListFiles require pool view; AddFiles/RemoveFiles/Reorder
require pool edit.
Adds regression tests for private-by-default listing (hidden / public /
granted / admin) and for pool operations rejecting a non-owner.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replacing a file's content left the old {id}_thumb.jpg / {id}_preview.jpg
in the cache, and the cache-hit fast path kept serving the stale image
forever; permanent deletion left those files orphaned. FileStorage gains
InvalidateCache, which Replace and PermanentDelete now call.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The auth middleware trusted any unexpired, well-signed access token, so
logout, session termination and admin blocks had no effect until the
15-minute token expired. The middleware now validates that the token's
session is still active on every request (SessionRepo.GetByID), and
blocking a user deactivates all of their sessions, immediately revoking
their outstanding access tokens.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three related auth weaknesses:
- Access and refresh tokens were structurally identical, so a 30-day
refresh token was accepted as a bearer access token. Tokens now carry a
"typ" claim; the access path rejects refresh tokens and /refresh rejects
access tokens.
- Login stored the hash of a throwaway refresh token (sid=0) but returned
a re-issued one, so the stored hash never matched and /refresh always
401'd. Tokens are no longer re-issued: the refresh token is located by
hash and carries no session id, while the access token embeds the real
session id. A random jti keeps tokens unique within the same second.
- Login skipped bcrypt for unknown users (a timing oracle) and returned
403 for blocked accounts before checking the password (leaking account
existence). It now always runs a bcrypt comparison and verifies the
password before disclosing blocked state.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
007_seed_data.sql shipped a fixed admin account whose bcrypt hash decodes
to the password "admin", giving every deployment the same known
credentials. The seed row is removed; UserService.EnsureAdmin now creates
the administrator on startup from ADMIN_USERNAME / ADMIN_PASSWORD. It is
idempotent and never overwrites an existing password, so an operator who
rotates the admin password keeps it across restarts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two broken-access-control holes:
- PUT/DELETE /files/:id/tags(/:tag_id) and GET /files/:id/tags went
straight to TagService with no ACL check, letting any authenticated
user read or rewrite tags on anyone's private files. The handlers now
require view (list) or edit (mutate) on the target file via new
FileService.AuthorizeView/AuthorizeEdit helpers.
- POST /files/import accepted an arbitrary host path from any user,
turning it into an arbitrary server-side file read. It is now
admin-only and the supplied path is confined to IMPORT_PATH.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
GET/PUT /acl/:object_type/:object_id performed no authorization check, so
any authenticated user could read the permission list of, or grant
themselves view/edit on, any file/tag/category/pool. ACLService now
resolves the object's owner and rejects callers who are neither the owner
nor an admin. SetPermissions also wraps its delete+insert replace in a
single transaction so a partial failure can no longer wipe permissions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extend PATCH /tags/{id}/rules/{then_id} to accept apply_to_existing bool.
When a rule is activated with apply_to_existing=true, a single recursive
CTE retroactively inserts the full transitive expansion of then_tag into
data.file_tag for all files already carrying when_tag:
WITH RECURSIVE expansion(tag_id) AS (
SELECT then_tag_id
UNION
SELECT r.then_tag_id FROM data.tag_rules r
JOIN expansion e ON r.when_tag_id = e.tag_id
WHERE r.is_active = true
)
INSERT INTO data.file_tag ... ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING
Changes:
- port/repository.go: add applyToExisting param to TagRuleRepo.SetActive
- db/postgres/tag_repo.go: implement recursive CTE retroactive apply
- service/tag_service.go: thread applyToExisting through SetRuleActive
- handler/tag_handler.go: parse apply_to_existing from PATCH body
- openapi.yaml: document apply_to_existing on PATCH endpoint
- integration test: add TestTagRuleActivateApplyToExisting covering
no-op when false, direct+transitive apply when true
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add UserService (GetMe, UpdateMe, admin CRUD with block/unblock),
UserHandler (/users, /users/me), ACLHandler (GET/PUT /acl/:type/:id),
AuditHandler (GET /audit with all filters). Fix UserRepo.Update to
include is_blocked. Wire all remaining routes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add pool repo (gap-based position ordering, cursor pagination, add/remove/reorder
files), service, handler, and wire all /pools endpoints including
/pools/:id/files, /pools/:id/files/remove, and /pools/:id/files/reorder.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add category repo, service, handler, and wire all /categories endpoints
including list, create, get, update, delete, and list-tags.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
AuditRepo.Log resolves action_type_id/object_type_id via SQL subqueries.
AuditRepo.List supports dynamic filtering by user, action, object type/ID,
and date range with COUNT(*) OVER() for total count.
AuditService.Log reads user from context, marshals details to JSON,
and delegates to the repo.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add postgres ACLRepo (List/Get/Set) and ACLService with CanView/CanEdit
checks (admin bypass, public flag, creator shortcut, explicit grants)
and GetPermissions/SetPermissions for the /acl endpoints.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Login: bcrypt credential validation, session creation, JWT pair issuance.
Logout/TerminateSession: soft-delete session (is_active = false).
Refresh: token rotation — deactivate old session, issue new pair.
ListSessions: marks IsCurrent by comparing session IDs.
ParseAccessToken: for use by auth middleware.
Claims carry uid (int16), adm (bool), sid (int). Refresh tokens are
stored as SHA-256 hashes; raw tokens never reach the database.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
H1K0