Run gofmt -w across the backend, normalising the manually-aligned := blocks
to the gofmt standard. No code behaviour changes.
Add Prettier (+ prettier-plugin-svelte) to the frontend with the SvelteKit
default config (tabs, single quotes) so formatting is reproducible, then run
it over the whole tree. Add format / format:check npm scripts and a
.prettierignore (build output, generated schema.ts, static assets).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Listings returned every row regardless of ownership: GET /files, /tags,
/pools and /categories exposed other users' private items (while the
single-item GET correctly returned 403), and the pool file operations
(GET /pools/:id, /pools/:id/files, add/remove/reorder) skipped ACL
entirely, so any authenticated user could read and rewrite anyone's
private pool.
- List queries now filter to rows the caller may see (public, owned, or
granted can_view) via a shared SQL condition; admins bypass. The viewer
identity is taken from the request context by the service and passed to
the repository in the list params.
- Tag/Category/Pool single-item Get now enforce CanView (File already did).
- Pool Get/ListFiles require pool view; AddFiles/RemoveFiles/Reorder
require pool edit.
Adds regression tests for private-by-default listing (hidden / public /
granted / admin) and for pool operations rejecting a non-owner.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replacing a file's content left the old {id}_thumb.jpg / {id}_preview.jpg
in the cache, and the cache-hit fast path kept serving the stale image
forever; permanent deletion left those files orphaned. FileStorage gains
InvalidateCache, which Replace and PermanentDelete now call.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two broken-access-control holes:
- PUT/DELETE /files/:id/tags(/:tag_id) and GET /files/:id/tags went
straight to TagService with no ACL check, letting any authenticated
user read or rewrite tags on anyone's private files. The handlers now
require view (list) or edit (mutate) on the target file via new
FileService.AuthorizeView/AuthorizeEdit helpers.
- POST /files/import accepted an arbitrary host path from any user,
turning it into an arbitrary server-side file read. It is now
admin-only and the supplied path is confined to IMPORT_PATH.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
H1K0